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NOTES.
TAX ON LIFE ESTATES IN INCO ME OF TRUST FuNDs.-The

case

of Gavit v. Irwin, recently affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
(413)
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and now before the. Supreme Court of the United States,' raises several interesting questions concerning the taxability of the income
from trust estates. The case arose under the will of Anthony N.
Brady, in which the testator divided his estate into- six equal shares,
and devised one share to his executors in trust, to pay the income
in their discretion for the support and maintenance of the testator's
granddaughter. Any balance of the income remaining after such
.support and maintenance had been provided was to be divided -into
two parts, one of which was to go to the plaintiff annually during his
life, with minor limitations. For the tax years of 1913, 1914 and
1915 certain sums of money were paid to the plaintiff as -his share
of the income, and he reported these sums and paid income tax
thereon under protest. This suit was to recover back the taxes thus
paid, as not being within the Income Tax Act of 1913. It was hed

that the plaintiff could recover, these sums not being within the
meaning of that act.
Such a testamentary trust is quite common, and the nice questions which it raises under the several late income tax acts-are therefore so vital as to deserve examination. The purpose of this note
is to discuss the taxability of the income from such a trust, under
these acts from 1913 to date.

It is first necessary to closely scrutinize the nature of the beneficiary's interest in the principal ease. It appears that the testator,
by devising the share of the corpus of his estate to trustees, and bequeathing the income thereof to the beneficiary, without giving the
latter any vested or contingent right in the corpus, has effectually
separated principal from income.' It is well recognized that "a testator may dispose of the income of his property, separate and apart
from the principal," 3 and that an intention to do so "is generally
or by limiting the
manifested either by creating an express trust
4
interest to a life interest in the income only." The income of the estate, thus separated from the corpus, is
property itself;' and since this is the property which is given to
the beneficiary, the only conclusion can be that the income is the
subject of the gift. There is nothing anomalous to this; for although
it will later be seen that a gift is not income, this does not mean that
income cannot be the subject of a gift. In fact, income has long
92ix); affirmed, Circuit Court of
'273 Fed. 643 (Dist. Court, N. Y.,
Appeals for the Second Circuit, No. 883, October Term, 1923; docketed in
Supreme Court on petition for writ of certiorari on March 13, 192+ This
petition is now pending, no action as yet having been taken by the Supreme
Court.
'Inre Little, (88) W. N. 138.
'Gardner, Wills (ist ed. i9o3) 488.
"Page, Wills (ist ed. igor) 691.
'In re Opinion of Justices. 22o Mvass. 613, io8 N. E. 570 (1915); State
v. Pender, io8 AtI. 43 (Del. 1919); Eliasberg Brothers v. Grimes, 2o4 Ala.
492, 86 So. 56 (1920).

-
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been sustained as the subject of a valid gift. This is brought out
sharply in cases where a testator, having certain property yielding
an income at the time of his death, devises the property to a trustee,
and the income to abeneficiary. In such cases it is invariably held
that the beneficiary takes the income of the estate from the date of
the death of the testator, and not from one year thereafter.' The
reason for such a case being different from the general rule that
legacies bear interest from one year after the testator's death, is that
in the present case, the income for the year in question is specifically
bequeathed. As was said in one case, "it is the income which constitutes the respondent's legacy. He is not seeking to charge the
estate with interest upon his legacy, but is simply endeavoring to
recover the legacy itself." ' Of equal aptness is another's court's
statement that "the natural meaning of such a provision and of the
language used, would seem to be a series of legacies or bequests." I
The problem in Gazit v.Irwin 9 can therefore be restated to be
whether a legacy, periodically paid to the legatee who has no interest whatsoever in the principal, is taxable as income under the provisions of the income tax acts 10
Under the Act of 1913,1" it seems that such legacies are not
taxed. The act provides that income includes "the income from but
not the value of property acquired by gift, devise, bequest or descent." 12 If the premise is accepted, that the income from a trust
fund in which the legatee has no interest, is the very property which
the legatee acquires by bequest,"3 there seems to be no escape from
the conclusion that this is specifically exempted by this provision of
the act. The decision in Gavit v. Irwin 14 goes squarely on this
ground."5
*Cooke v. Meeker, 36 N. Y. i5(1867); Matter of Stanfield, 135 N. Y.
3 N. E. 1013 (1892); Mackay v. Mackay, 107 Cal. 303, 40 Fac. 55E
(i895); Disston v. McLain, 147 Fed. 14 (C. C. A. i9o6); Lynch v. Union
Trustt Co., 164 Fed. i61 (C. C. A. igo8).
Maynard, I., in Matter of Stanfield, supra in note 6.
'Gray, C. J., in Disston v. McLain, supra in note 6.
'Supra in note r.
'The conclusion of this noti being that such legacies are not included
in any of the Income Tax Acts, it will be unnecessary to discuss the constitutionality of the taxation of such legacies except as this may be necessary in construing the Acts themselves.
u38 Stat. L. 66, c. 16, enacted Oct. 3, i913.
"Section II, subdivision B.
'Supra in notes 6, 7 and 8, and the text corresponding thereto.
"Supra in note z.
Cooper, .".: "If these moneys received by the plaintiff from the trustees from this one-sixth portion of the estate are income as to him, where is
the property acquirej by the plaintiff from the Brady estate-in other words
his capital, either in present possession or right of future possession, from
which the income arose? Clearly there is none. He never gets the properly
which produces the income. So as to him there is not both the property
acquired by gift, devise cr descent and the income thereof.!
292,
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In the Acts of 1916 20 and 1917,17 the provisions applicable to
our problem are identical, and can be considered together. In each
act, there is the provision that "the value of property acquired by
the income
gift, bequest, devise or descent" shall be exempt, "but
8
This clause
from such property shall be included as income.'
being-the same as that in the Act of i913,19 the exemption of a periodical legacy'would again be the result. -However, the same acts also
contain the provision that "income held for future distribution under
the terms of the Will" 20 is to be taxed to the estate, "provided that
when the income is to be distributed annually or regularly between
existing heirs or legatees, the rate of tax and method of computing
the same shall be based in each case upon the amount of the individual share to be distributed," and also that the trustees "shall have
the beneficiary in
credit for the amounts of such payments against
2
any account which they make as such trustees' '
It seems clear that these latter clauses do not technically conflict with the exemption which is carried over from the Act of 1913.
The legatee still gets his periodical legacy, and this is exempt; however, this legacy grows out of the income of the estate, and while it
is still in the hands of the trustee, it is income and is taxable. The
tax, paid by the trustee, is then deducted from the gross income, and
the balance is paid to the legatee as the net income. As far as the
normal tax is concerned, the result is therefore the same, from the
viewpoint of the legatee, as if the income had been taxed in his
hands, and likewise as regards the surtax, provided the legatee has
no income independent of this Idgacy. When the surtax is taken
into consideration, and the legatee does have a separate income, this
provision taxing each distributive share separately works to the advantage of the legatee.'2 However this may be, it must be remembered that the whole question in Gavit v. Irwin 13 was whether the
tax law contained any provision taxing the legacy as income of the
legatee. Although taxing the legacy while it is stilltin the hands of
the trustee may produce a result which in many cases is similar, and
in some cases identical to that which would be produced by taxing
3 39 Stat L. 756, c. 463, enacted Sept. 8, x91.
U140 Stat. L 3oo, c. 63, enacted Oct. 3, 1917. This act is amendatory
of the Act of 1916, and leaves in force such provisions of that former Act
as are not specifically amended.

" Section 4 (4) of the Act of 1916, unamended by the Act of z917.
Supra in note xr.
" Section 2 (b) 3.
n Section 2 (b) 4.
"For instance, suppose the beneficiary annually receives $xoo,ooo from

the trust, and has a separate income of $io6,ooo. If this total of $2oo,oo0
were taxed in his hands, he would pay surtax on this; if the legacy were
taxed in the hands of the trustee, and the other $iooooo in the hands of
the legatee, the effect would be thakt the total surtax would be less.
"Supra in note Z.

NOTES

the legacy in- the hands of the legatee, still the method of producing
the result is different in the two cases. The Acts of 1916 and 1917
choose to take the former method, and tax the trustee. This, therefore, cannot be -said to have any -bearing on the exact question in
Gavit v. Iruin,' which involves the latter method, taxing the legatee.
The Acts of 1918 - 1 and 1921 26 may also be considered together, since the applicable sections of each are practically identical.
Section 213 of each act again includes the provision for the exemption of property received by gift, devise, bequest or descent, but declares the income therefrom to be taxable. 27 Thus far the result in
Gavit v. Irwin

2

would be inevitable.

However, section

219

em-

bodies the additional stipulation that the tax and surtax "shall apply
to the income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust,
including

. .

. income which is to be distributed to the legatees

periodically,"29 and in such case "the tax shall not be paid by the
fiduciary, but there shall be included in computing the net income of
each beneficiary, that part of the income of the istate or trust"
which is distributed to him according to the terms of the trust.30
In other words, section 213 exempts a legacy, and section 219
taxes the income from any trust fund. What, then, is the status
of a legacy which is the income from a trust fund, as in Gavit zQ
Irwin?2 It might be argued that the money received by the legatee
in such a case is purely a legacy and therefore exempt under section
213. However, such an argument totally ignores the fact that although the money is undoubtedly a legacy, it still is the income from
a trust estate. As has been said before, it is income which is the
subject of a gift. It might equally well be argued on the other
side that even though the money is received from a legacy, it is the
income from a trust fund and hence taxable under section 219.
This argunient would be equally fallacious in that it disregards the
plain fact that the income from the trust fund is a legacy. If the
facts of the situation are to be fairly regarded, there is no escape
from the conclusion that the beneficiary's share is received as a legacy, but it still is the income from a trust fund; and that therefore
each of the sections applies with equal definiteness. Neither covers
the case so exclusively or specifically as to be considered an exception to the other, for obviously there are other kinds of legacies included under section 213, and other kinds of trusts included under
Supra in note r.

c. 18, enacted Feb. 24, x9i9, retroactive to Jan. t,
U42 Stat. L. 275, enacted Nov. 23, 1921.
"Section 213 (b) 3 of each act.
"4o Stat. L.

1o57

Supra in note z.
219 (a) (4) of each act.
Section 219 (d) of each act.
"Supra in note z.

"Section
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section 219. Hence, there is nothing in the wording of the sections
or in their intrinsic applicability which can be the basis for determining which applies in the present case.
It is submitted, however, that on a definite and well-settled
principle of statutory interpretation, section 213 can be found to
apply, and the legacy therefore exempt. This conclusion is reached
on the premise that the application of section 219 to this case would
render that section unconstitutional; and by applying to that premise
the well-settled rule that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the legislature, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of
two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which
will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality." 2
The constitutionality of section 219 as applied to the case of-a
legacy of .income, depends upon whether such a legacy is "income"
within the meaning of the word as used in the Sixteenth Amendment.33 This amendment " ' states that "the Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without
regard to any census or enumeration." Our problem, therefore, is
whether this word "income" as here used includes the money received by one who receives a legacy of income.
It is 'well settled that judicial definitions of words in a statute
either before or after the enactment of the statute, are generally of
controlling force in determining its meaning. 3 Prior to the passing
of the amendment, "decisions had established a definite meaning of
the word 'income' for the purpose of constitutional construction." 36
This definite meaning was that income is something distinct from its
source, and is the product thereof. 37 Subsequent decisions further
crystallized this meaning 3 s until it was emphatically announced in
aBlack,

Interpretation of Laws (2d ed., I911) 113, and cases there

collected.

'A tax on income is a direct tax, and unless apportioned, is contrary

to Art. i,Se. 2,of the Constitution. Pollock v. Farmers' Trust Co., 158
U. S. 6oi (1895). Any tax on income, not apportioned, must derive its
validity from the Sixteenth Amendment.

Bushaber v. Union Pacific R. R.

Co., 24o U. S. I (qi6).
"Declared in force February 25, 1913.

"United States v. Freight Ass'n, s8 Fed. 58, 7 C. C. A. i5 (1893)

United States v. Cerecedo, 209 U. S. 338, 52 L. Ed. 821 (1908); People v.
Covelesky, 217 Mich. 90, i85 N. W. 770 (i92i); Black Interpretation of

Laws (2d ed. i91i) 186.

" Thomas, J., in Brewster v. Walsh, 268 Fed. 207 (1920), citing and
approving Eisner v. Macomber, infra in note 39.
"Gray v. Darlington, iS Vall. 63, 21 L. Ed. 45 (1872); Gibbons v.
Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 34 L ed. 525 (889); Matter of Rogers, 161 N. Y.
io8, 55 N. E. 393 (1899). Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 5oi, 7o C. C. A.
68o (19o4).
a Strattons Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 58 *L Ed. 285

(1913); Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U. S. 179; 38 S. Ct. 4

(1918); Lynch v.
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the case of Eisner v. Macomber.3 9 The court in this case stated that
income is "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both,
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale of
capital assets." "' This definition, with the emphasis placed on .the
words "derived from," has since been constantly quoted and approved by the Federal courts, 1 until it can be accepted as the meaning which courts have constantly given to the word "income," both
before and after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.
In the light of this definition, the amendment gives Congress
the power to tax only "gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both," without apportionment. It seems that a legacy of income is not within the scope of this power. Such a legacy as it
comes into the hands of the legatee, is not a gain from any capital of
his, for he has no interest whatsoever in the principal trust fund.
True, it would undoubtedly be income in the bands of the trustee,
whose capital produces it; 42 but the capital of the trust fund cannot be called the capital of the legatee. Suppose the trustee owns
a separate business from which he makes a profit, and out of this
profit he annually makes a present to the legatee; it is obvious that
the capital of this business is not capital of the legatee, so as to
make the gift "income." The situation in Gazvt v. Irwin 'sis no
different, for the legatee there has no more right, title or interest
in the trust fund than he would have in the supposititious case. The
only conclusion is that the legacy of income is not "income" within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, and therefore cannot be
directly taxed even though it may be included as income in the
phrasing of the tax act.
That the principal of the trust fund cannot be-capital of the
legatee, is generally admitted by those who maintain that the legacy
is income. However, it is then argued that the legacy flows from
Hornby, 247 U. S. 339; 38 S. Ct. 543 (i9i8); Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S.
38 S. Ct. 537 (xi8); Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347; 38 S. Ct. 546
(1918).
252 U. S. 189; 40 S. Ct. 18 (1920).
"Pitney, J., went on to say, "Briet as it is, it (the definition) indicates
the characteristic and distinguishable attribute of income essential for a
correct solution of the controversy. Here we have the essential matter:
not a gain accruing to capital; not a growlh or increment of value in thq
investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceedingi
from the property, severed from the capital however employed, and coming
in, being derived, that is, recehed or draun by the recipient; that is income
from property. Nothing else answers the description.
" Cited, qudted, and approved in Brewster v. Walsh, supra in note 36;
Gavit v. Irwin. supra in note I; Merchants' Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.
S. 509, 41 S. Ct. 386 (i92r) ; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527, 65 L. Ed.
785 (921) ; Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U. S. 536, 41 S. Ct. 392 (1921).
2It
will be recalled that the Acts of i916 and 1917 taxed this income
221,

in the hands of the trustees.
' Supra in note r.
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the right of the legatee to receive4 it and that this right is therefore
capital, and the legacy is income. '
This argument, if not entirely fallacious,-is at-least extremely
tenuous. First, it rests on the premise.that the legatee gets some
"right" upon the death of the testator. There is no doubt validity
to such a premise when the legacy is to be composed of the income
from a certain fund which is in existence, or fairly certain to come
into existence, capable of yielding income. However, it will be recalled that in Gavit v. Irwin'5 the beneficiary 'was to receive-only
that amioUnt of the income which annually remained after the trustee had* in his discretion provided maintenance for the testator's
granddaughter. The trustee might choose to use all the income for
such maintenance, and thus the legatee's so-called "right" would be
extinguished. To say that an interest which can be extinguished by
a stranger at his pleasure can possibly be called a vested right, seems
unreasonable.
However, even in cases where it may be maintained that the
legatee does get a valuable "right" upon the death of the testator,
as in the case of a fixed income or annuity, this does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the money received by the legatee is
income. Any legatee has a right to receive his legacy, but this does
not necessarily mean that his legacy is income, and no longer a pure
gift. Similarly, as pointed out in Gasit v. Irwin," "Heirs have a
right'I to inherit.. That does not make their inheritance income."
In conclusion, it can only be said that the periodical bequests
received by the legatee in Gavit v. Irwin 41 are not gain from any
capital of the legatee, and therefore are not income within the meaning of this word as used in the Sixteenth Amendment. Therefore,
if Congress specifically included such legacies in section 219 of the
Act of I92i, this provision is unconstitutional, as long as the judicial definition of income remains unchanged; and if another construction can be placed on the section, this must be done. Hence the
construction would have to be that such legacies were meant to be
included in section 213 and not in section 219; and by virtue of the
former section, they are exempt. The result is, that such legacies
are specifically exempt under all the income tax acts which have
been in force since the Sixteenth Amendment went into force.
Several interesting practical results might be produced, however, if, after the above conclusion had been reached by the courts,
legatees of periodical payments of income should recover back the

"This was the main contention of the government in Gavit v. Irwin.

The court's answer to the argument is stated later in the text.
"Supra in note i.

aSupra in note z.
*Italics

from the opinion.

S Supra in note

i.
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tax mistakenly paid on such legacies. Perhaps such would not be
the wisest course for the legatees to pursue; for although the legacy
could not be taxed in their hands, there is nothing to prevent its
being taxed in the hands of the trustee, as was specifically done
under the Acts of 1916 and 1917. Nothing in the Act of 1921. appears to prevent this, for the income is income while it is in the
hands of the trustee. In any case where there are several legatees
taking shares of the income of a trust fund, if this should be taxed
in the hands of the trustee before being divided, the result would be
a much higher surtax being heaped on the share of -each legatee,
than would be imposed if each were to pay the surtax on his own
share only. On the other hand, if the total net income of the legatee
were less than the total net income of the trust fund, it would no
doubt be to the legatees advantage to stand on the decision of
Gazit v. Irwin, even if the result would be taxation of all the income
in the trust fund as a lump sum, in the hands of the trustee. It can
at least be said that, if the Supreme Court affirms Gavit v. Irwin,
many interesting situations will result.
M.E.G.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING LAws.-The great number
of zoning ordinances, enacted by many American cities, in pursuance of state enabling statutes, since the war period, are now coming
before the Supreme Courts of the various states, it seems almost
simultaneously. This serves to emphasize the contrariety of judicial
opinion as to their constitutionality, in their various phases. These
ordinances, broadly speaking, have to do with the use to be made of
property, and. are, in general, of two kinds. The first establishes
zones throughout the entire city, permitting only certain uses of
property in each of these zones-what is sometimes called a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The second sort' provides that in districts where there is a certain proportion of residences, no uses other
than residential shall be made of any property without the consent
of the majority of the residents. While all the ordinances of the
first sort and most of the second have been passed professedly in
the exercise of the police power, yet in some of the ordinances of the
second class, the authority was claimed under the power of eminent
domain.
The comprehensive zoning ordinance has been held a valid exercise of the police power in several states 1 and has been denied to
be such in others. 2 One of the most recent cases, after holding the
'Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp.. 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E.
2o9 (i92,o); Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, T27 N. E. 525 (1920'):
Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kans. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923); State v. Harper, ig6
N. W. 451 (Wis. 1923).
'State v. Edgecomb, io8 Neb. 859, 189 N. W. 617 (1922).; State V.
McKelvey, 256 S. NV. 474 (Mo.

19z3).

The New Jersey court investigates
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ordinance invalid as an exercise of the police power, on rehearing
held it invalid only because compensation had not been made for
the restriction of the use.3 Another court, sustaining such an ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power, intimates that it is in
no sense the exercise of the power of eminent domain.4 The power
of eminent domain would apply to the restriction of separate pieces
of property in a single district, perhaps, but has no application to a
involving a whole city, in the opincomprehensive zoning ordinance
ion of the Wisconsin court 3 And this seemed at first to be the opinion of the lissouri court also in the case of State v. McKclvey. But
only three of the seven judges concurred in the reasoning of this
opinion. On rehearing, however, the court, while affirming that such
an ordinance was invalid under the police power; declared that it
would be valid under the power of eminent domain, if compensation
were provided.
As to the second class of ordinance, restricting only certain dissplit as to whether this is a
tricts, the courts are again fairly evenly
valid exercise of the police power,7 two neighboring courts giving
opinions directly contrary, within the same month.8 In the only case
in which such ordinance has been based upon the right of eminent
domain, and compensation provided for the restriction of the use,
the court at first held the ordinance unconstitutional, and then on rehearing, upheld it over two dissents. 9
It will be seen that in this state of the authorities it is doubtful
whether either of these sorts of zoning ordinance is valid either as
an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain.
It is almost inevitable that some of these cases will soon come before
the United States Supreme Court, in view of their importance, and
the great divergence of judicial opinion, even within one court, on
the subject. In view of this fact, the decisions of the Supreme
Court relating to this general subject become of great interest. In
each provision of the ordinance, and decides separately on the validity of
each as it is presented. Thus while it held. constitutional the Act enabling
municipalities to pass zoning ordinances, Schait v. Senior, ii7 At. 517 (192z),
yet it held such ordinance invalid in so far as it prevented the building of a
comer grocery store in a residential district. Ignaciunas v. Risley, 121 At.
783 (1923).
'State v. McKelvey, 256 S. W. 474 (Mo. 1923).
'State v. Harper, 196 N. W. 451 (Wis. 1923).
Id.
'Supra in note 3.
'Holding such ordinance constitutional; Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil
Co., 193 Iowa io96, i88 N. W. 921 (1921); State v. New Orleans, 97 So.
44o (La. 1923). Holding the ordinance unconstitutional; Spann v. Dallas,
,II Tex. 35o, 235 S. W. 513 (1921); Fitzhugh v. Jackson, 97 So. 19o (Miss.
1923).
'Compare Fitzhugh v. Jackson, supra in note 7 with State v. New Orleans, supra in note 7.
'State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. T, 174 N. W. 885, 176 N. W. r59 (192o).

NOTES

Welch v. Swasey,10 the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance
in Massachusetts regulating the height of buildings as a valid, exercise of the police power. The Court held that the regulation was
reasonably necessary for the protection of the safety, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the community. The Supreme Court
adopted the view of the state court on these matters, saying that its
judgment upon such matters, local in character, should'be conclusive, unless it appeared to the Court that they were obviously unreasonable or inappropriate.
How far this applies to use restrictions is not yet known. The
influence of many of these ordinances upon public safety and welfare seems rather remote. The purpose of some of them seems
purely aesthetic. Whether such regulations will be considered obviously unreasonable or inappropriate remains to be seen. The
proponents of the law derive much of their argument from the socalled expansion of the police power to meet complex modern conditions, frequently quoting from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Noble State Bank v. Haskell:" "It may be said in a general way
that the police power extends to all the great public needs. . . .
It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held
by the prevailing morality, or strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." But it
will be seen that, for those who wish to speculate as to the Court's
action on zoning ordinances restricting the use of property, this
statement leaves the matter almost untouched. Concede this kind
of law to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare and all doubts as to its validity are dissipated. It is as to the
urgency and magnitude of the need that the controversy rages.
But even admitting that such law be a valid exercise of the
plice power under certain conditions, it seems that under Welch v.
wascy,' the state court would be the final arbiteras to when there
was such urgency, except in very clear cases. Therefore, it is very
doubtful as to whether those states which have decided against the
laws will be reversed by the Supreme Court.
Whether those cases which have upheld the law will be affirmed
is perhaps even more doubtful. The taking of the use of a man's
property without compensation appears unjustifiable unless vitally
and directly necessary to the public welfare. Even the power of
eminent domain can be exercised only for the public welfare more
or less directly. The reactions of the state judges to this question
are as varied as it is possible for them to be, depending upon the
environment and whole social attitude of the judge and the court
in which he sits.
G. F.F.
2T4 U. S. 91 (rgog).
U219

U.

S. 104, 111 (1911).

"214 U. S. 9r (i9o9).
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POWER OF NATIOxAL BANKS TO ESTABLISt BRAxCiES.-- On
January 28, 1924, a decision of much importance was delivered by
the United States Supreme Court in the case of First National Bank
v. State of Missouri.2 The State of Missouri brought a proceeding
in the nature of quo -warrantoaverring that the bank was maintaining a branch in contravention of its charter and of the National
Bank Act 2 under which it was incorporated and also in violation of
a Missouri statutes providing "that no bank shall maintain in this
State a branch bank, or receive 'deposits or pay checks except in
its own banking house." The State Supreme Court having determined the case against the bank 4 it appealed to the United States
Supreme Court the question whether or not the state law was valid
as applied to national banks and whether the state could call a national bank to account for-the acts alleged.
The Supreme Court in its majority opinion rules that national
banks are subject to general state laws unless such laws conflict
with the Federal laws, interfere with the purposes for which national banks are created, or tend to impair or destroy their efficiency
as Federal agencies. In order to determine whether the state law in
question conflicts with Federal law, the Court proceeds to ascertain
whether or not the Federal law, namely, the National Bank Act,
empowers national banks to maintain branches, and decides that, not
only does it not give, but that it impliedly denies such power; that,
therefore, the Missouri law is not in conflict, does not interfere with
nor impair the efficiency of national banks, and is validly applicable to them; also that the state can, as in this case, call a national
bank to account.
An interesting and well-reasoned dissenting opinion delivered by
Justice Van Devanter, concurred in by the Chief justice and justice Butler, disagrees with the rule laid down by the majority as to
the operation of state laws upon national banks, and contends that
though a national bank may be subject to state laws as to its dealings and contracts, it cannot be so as to its corporate powers and
since the power to establish a branch is a corporate power, the laws
of IMissouri cannot affect it one way or another and cannot validly
apply. Thus disposing of the case, the minority opinion does not
discuss the question of power to establish a branch. In this note we
will not consider this question of constitutional law and will treat
only the other phase of the case.
It has long been a question of great interest to the financial
world whether or not a national bank has power under the National Bank Act to establish a branch. Since neither this act nor

I No. 252 adv. op. U. S. Sup. Ct.-Jan. 28, 1924.
'Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 343, iS Stat. L. 123; 6 Fed: Stat. Ann. (2d
ed.) 65o.
"Sec. zx37, R. S. Mo., xi99.
,Barrett v. ist Nat. Bank, 249 S. NV. 61g (Mo. 1923).
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any subsequent general act contains any provision expressly dealing
with the subject, it is a matter of construction whether or not such
a power may be implied from the act or, if not, whether it may be
exercised under the clause giving a national bank "all such incidental power as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking. '" Itis remarkable that, in the half century since the enactment of this law providing for the incorporation of national banks,
there has been up to this year no judicial determination of the question by the United States courts. There have been in the past,
several opinions delivered by the executive officers of the Federal
Government, answering it in the negative, and some unofficial opinions on both sides.
An affirmative view of the problem, as presented by Lewis C.

Williams in the VIRGUNIA LAW REViEw 6 attributes two possible
meanings to the term "branch": (x) a branch bank which is in reality a- bank in itself, carrying on a general banking business and requiring a separate organization, and (2) a branch office which has
only limited functions of agency for the main bank. The first, it is
admitted, is unauthorized, but the second, it is contended, is authorized as an incidental power since not expressly or impliedly prohibited
by any provision of the National Bank Act. The only two sections
of that act referring in any way to the place where a national bank
shall transact its business are the following:
Revised Statutes, section 5134, provides that the organization
certificate of a national banking association shall specifically state
"the place where its operations of discount and deposit are carried
on, designating the state, territory or district, and the particular
county, and city, town, or village."
Revised Statutes, section 519o, provides that "the usual-business
of each national banking association shall be transacted at an office
or banking house located in the place specified in its organization
certificate." By construing the article "aie" in this latter section'tan office or banking house"--not to mean one, on the ground that
Revised Statutes, section i, provides that "words importing the
singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or
things," but rather to mean that the "usual business" must be transacted at fixed or recognized offices within the "city, town, or village"
as distinguished from the 'curb' or 'from place to place'-by this
construction, Mr. Williams renders ineffective the only clause in the
act that can definitely limit a national bank to one office. This meaning also renders inapplicable further reasons advanced in other opinions for the reverse construction,7 i. e., that banks can have only
one office or banking house for "usual business."
'R. S., U. S., sec. 5136.
t

9 VA. L.REv. x, (No. x,Nov. 1922).
Note 6, rupra, pp. lo-I3.
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However, the weight of opinion has favored the reverse construction. In an opinion delivered in 191x the Attorney General of
the United States" summarizes prior official opinions from the Federal executive departments, as follows: "On August. io, 1899, Solicitor Hepburn held, in an opinion rendered at the request of the
Comptroller, that under section 519o, Revised Statutes, a banking
association had to transact its usual business in one office or banking
house. That this construction has been uniformly followed and
concurred in is shown by the 'Instructions and suggestions of The
Comptroller of the Currency relating to the organization, etc. of
national banks' issued i99, ..
"On November 15, i9io-the present Solicitor of your department (Treasury)-after mature and careful consideration concurred
in the opinion of Solicitor Hepburn." The Attorney General then
sums up his own exhaustive opinion in two sentences: "First, independently of section 519o, Revised Statutes, a national bank is not,
under its charter, authorized to establish a branch or co-ordinate
office for the purpose of carrying on a general banking business in the
place designated in its certificate of organization, and, second, that
section 519o, Revised Statutes, properly construed 'restricts the carrying on of the general banking business by a national bank to one 9
office or banking house in the place designated in the association's
certificate of organization." 20
It must be noted that the Attorney General would restrict a
national bank to one office only as to its "general banking business."
In the first part of his opinion he distinguishes between a branch for
general business and an agency, stating that cases with reference
to state banks "clearly indicate that the courts recognize a vital distinction between a mere agency for the transaction of a particular
business and a branch bank wherein is carried on a general banking
business," 1 thus inferring that a national bank may have power
to establish- a branch office for purposes of mere agency in one particular kind of business. He cites several text-writers who make the
same distinction as to state banks. 2 Opinions by Thomas B. Paton
while General Counsel of the American Bankers' Association, on
this question, while denying the power to establish a branch bank,
admit that as to an agency for some particular kind of business "the
question is not entirely free from doubt." 13 These views all limit
29 Op;. Atty. Gen. 81.
Italics our own.

"Note 8, supra, p. 98. We have been unable to obtain a copy of a re-

,ent opinion of the Attorney General, dated Oct. 3, 1923.

Note 8, jupra. p;. 87.

" Morse, Banks and Banking, (5th ed. 1917), section 46; 1 Morawe,
Corporations, sec. 387 (2d ed. 1886); Zane, Banks and Banking, see. 24
(igoo). See also Magee, Banks and Banking, sec. 3o (3d ed. 192) for an
excellent discussion of this whole* subject
" Dig. of Leg. Op. of Thomas B. Paton, secs. 59-5,a.

NOTES

the agency to transacting a particularkind of business, but Mr. Williams takes a broader view, that it can carry on the "usual business"
of the main bank. However, he restricts the location of such office
to the "place," i. e., city, town, or village, where the main bank is
situated,"' while the Attorney General and the others do not. restrict
it to the "place" or even to the state.
It was held by a Federal District Court under Revised Statutes,
section 519o, that a national bank cannot "provide for the cashing of
checks upon it at, any other place than at its office or banking
house," 15 but this does not necessarily mean that it can have only
one office. It may mean offices of the bank as distinguished from
offices of other banks, or elsewhere. The Supreme Court also decided that the "usual business" cannot be transacted outside of the
city, town, or village in which the bank is located, that being its construction of the word "place" in the above section. 8 This renders
Mr. Williams's restriction necessary. On the other hand, another
decision holds that, though a bank is restricted in its "usual business" to the place where it is situated, this "must be construed reasonably" and "the business of every bank away from its office--frequently large and important-is unavoidably done at the proper
place . . .,r This is perhaps authority for the opinion that a
bank may maintain an agency for transacting a particular kind of
business. These are the only Federal court decisions pertaining to
the question of branches up to the decision of the principal case.
In the principal case "I the Court reaches its decision that the
National Bank Act denies to a national bank the power of establishing a branch, first, by construing "an office or banking house" in
Revised Statutes, section 519o, to mean one, stating that section 1,
providing for a plural construction of singular words, is invoked
only "where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the
Statute" and that such is not the case here. Second, to support this
construction, the Court cites section 5138,19 providing that the minimum capital allowed to a national bank shall be fixed in proportion
to the population of the place where it is located, and alleges that
if Congress had intended to allow the establishment "of not one bank
only, but in addition as many banks as it saw fit, it is remarkable to
say the least that there should have been no provision for adjusting.
the capital to the latter contingency." Third, again in support, it
cites section 5155 20 whereby a state bank having branches may be-

" Note 6, supra, p. 6.
'Armstrong v. 2nd Nat. Bank, 38 Fed. 883, 886 (1889).
McCormick v. Market Bank, i6s U. S. 538, 549 (I87).

' 1 Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, io Wall. 604, 6sI (187o).

USupra in note x.

19R.

S. U. S., see,"S38.
"R. S. U. S., sec. siss.
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come a national bank and retain its branches, to show that this section, "confined by its terms as it is to existing institutions, may be
fairly considered as constituting an exception to the general
rule . . . and goes far in confirming the conclusion that the
general rule does not contemplate the establishment of branch
banks." Having thus determined that the power to establish branches
is "by fair construction of the statutes . . . found to be denied,"
the Court holds that it cannot be derived from the clause granting
incidental powers,21 for "an incidental power can avail neither to
create powers which expressly or by reasonable implication are
withheld, nor to enlarge powers given."
Here the Court expressly determined only that a national bank
cannot have a branch, but in no way defines that term, thus making
it necessary for us to ascertain what it means by a branch. From the
second point, that Congress in section 5138 would have in some
manner provided for branches in setting the minimum of capital, had
it intended banks to have branches, we might reasonably infer that
the Court had in mind only a branch bank transacting a general
banking business, of equal or nearly equal dignity to the main bank,
and requiring capital of its own. However, in construing section
519o ("the usual business shall be transacted at an office or bank")
to mean one office, it clearly rules that even a branch office for
"usual business" cannot be established. This leaves small room for
the functioning of any office other than the main bank, though the
possibility remains that a branch may be maintained, as previously
suggested, as a mere agency for the transacting of a particular
kind of business under the authority of Merchmts' Bank v. State
Bank.22 It is unfortunate that the Court did not go further in its
opinion and construe the meaning of the phrase "usual business" and
state once and for all what sort of branch agency or office, if any, a
national bank is authorized to establish.
The restilt of this case, briefly, seems to be that, under the National Bank Act, a national bank cannot establish or maintain any
office except its one main banking house, for the transaction of usual
business, though perhaps it may maintain a branch office for transacting some particular business. Such is the rule whether or not
the state in which it is situated allows banks in general to maintain
branches, for apart from the National Bank Act, it has no powers.
Under this ruling many national banks in large cities, which at present run branch offices at least for the purpose of receiving deposits
and paying checks which reasonably would seem to be "usual business," are probably acting in excess of their powers.
In 1917 the United States Supreme Court held that Congress
has power to authorize national banks to act as trustees, etc., to the
Supra in note 5.
Supra in note 17.
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same extent
as other banks and trust companies in the states of their
location, 23 on the ground mainly that a national bank can have all
powers that are necessary to enable it successfully to compete with
other corporatidns of a rival or quasi-rival nature. To be consistent
with such a theory, a national bank should also have power to
maintain branch banks in those states where other banks are percase, it will
mitted to do so, but under the ruling of the principal
24
require an act of Congress to give it such power.
G. S.S.
IS AN INJUNCTION AGAINST BRINGING SUIT ENTITLED TO
FAITH AND CREDIT?-The right of a court of equity in certain

FULL

cases

to enjoin a person within its jurisdiction from bringing a suit in
another jurisdiction has become so well established in this country
as scarcely to admit of denial.' It is when the person enjoined disregards the restraining order and attempts to start the suit in -a
foreign jurisdiction that an interesting and perplexing problem arises.
Is the state in which the suit is brought required by the Constitution
to give full faith and credit 2 to the restraining order of its sister
state?
The situation seldom arises because, though the suit be decided
favorably to the plaintiff in the foreign jurisdiction, he must forever
remain out of the jurisdiction granting the injunction or else subject

himself to a serious penalty for contempt of court. For the average
man, especially a property owner, such a prospect would be sufficient
to deter him from disregarding the court's decree. The few isolated
instances in which the problem has come before the courts have resulted in considerable confusion.
A recent illustration of the problem is found in the decision of

the 'Minnesota court in Frye v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. 8 'The
facts giving rise to the litigation in that case were as follows: The
plaintiff, a resident of Iowa, sought to recover in a 'Minnesota court
under the Federal Safety Appliance Act for personal injuries which
he claimed to have suffered in Iowa while a railroad switch foreman
in the employ of the defendant railroad, an interstate corporation
doing business in both Iowa and Minnesota, at a time when the parist Nat. Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416 (1917).
29 01. Atty. Gen. 8z, p. 96.
14 R. C. L 411. For complete discussion of American and English

"See
1

cases on this point, see

1o

GEoacn'rowN L. JoUR. 47.

See also notes in 59

A. S. R. 88o-85, 21 L R. -A. 71, 25 L. R. A. (M. S.) 267, 1o Ann. Cas. 26,
16 Ann. Cas. 473, Ann. Cas. 1913 B 2o4. For cases limiting the doctrine, see
6 M Nx. L Rrv. 4i.
'Art. 4, Sec. x--"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records or judicial proceedings of every other state.".
1195 N. W. 6-V (Minn. 1923).
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ties vvere engaging in interstate commerce. The trial court allowed
the case to go to a jury and a verdict of $5,ooo was rendered for
the plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the trial court should have refused to take
jurisdiction because of an Iowa injunction which had been issued at
the request of the defendant, restraining the plaintiff from bringing
suit in any other jurisdiction. Without going into its reasons, the
court held that the Iowa injunction had no extra-territorial effect
in Minnesota, citing as its precedent, Stae ex r'el. Bossung v. Dis-

trict CourtI decided a few yearg previously by a Minnesota court.
The decision in the Bossung case proceeds upon the ground that
an injunction operates in personam upon the one to whom it is directed and not upon the tribunal of the foreign state.5 rherefore
such tribunal is not directed to refrain from entertaining a suit and
should not refuse jurisdiction of a transitory action for tort arising
in a foreign state, though the plaintiff, a citizen of the foreign state,
had been enjoined from so proceeding 0
Only two other decisions dealing with the problem could be
found. In Fisher v. Pacific Ahltual Life Insurance Co.,' the Mis-

sissippi court, without discussing the full faith and credit clause,
decided upon conflict of laws principles that so long as an injunction by a Tennessee court against a citizen of that state remained in
force, such citizen would not be permtied to maintain an action in
the courts of Mississippi in violation of that injuncton., in so deciding the court extended the principle of interstate comity to a state
of facts not seemingly warranted by the decisions it cites in support
of its view. The cases9l upon which it relies deal with insolvency
proceedings where a receiver has been appointed by the court of the
first jurisdiction. In such a case a creditor who is enjoined by the
state in which he resides and by whom the receiver has been appointed will not be allowed to maintain a suit in another state. The
essential nature of the action in such cases seems so vastly different
as not to be of great weight in supporting the decision of the court
in the Fisher case. But whether or not the Fisher decision is cori4o Minn. 494, x68 N. W. S89 (1918).
'Weaver v. Alabama R. R. Co., 2oo Ala. 432, 76 Son. 364 (x917);

Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58 (1907); Kempson v. Kemp-

son, 58 N. J. Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (1899). Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107
(1887). See also Story, Equity Jurisdiction (14th ed.) sec. =z24; xS L. R.
A. (N. S.) ioo8 and note; and note in 33 HARv. L. REv.-g.
'Herrick v. Minneapolis, etc. Co., 31 Minn. ir, i6 N. W. 4r3 (883);
State v. District Court of Waseca County, 126 Minn. Sox, 148 N. W. 6,*
(1914). In the latter case a mandamus was granted compelling the court to

proceed with the trial when it had jurisdiction.
'112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (x196).

'See note in 28 YAx.z L. JouR. 4o5.
'Gilman v. Wetcham, 84 Wis. 6o; 54 N. W. 395 (1893); and Bacon &
Co. v. Home & Co., 123 Pa. 452, 16 At. 794 (1889).
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rect, it is scarcely in point with the principal case which arose under
a Federal statute and therefore did not involve a conflict of laws
question.
The other decision offers a still different solution. It is the case
of Dobson v. Pearce'0 where an injunction was granted by a Connecticut court to prevent execution in another state of a judgment
shown to have been obtained by fraud. There, in the course of the
argument, the court said: "The decree of the court of chancery of
the state of Connecticut as an operative decree, as far as it enjoined
and restrained the parties, had no extra-territorial efficacy, as
an injunction does not affect the courts of this state, but the judgment of the court upon the matters litigated is conclusive upon the
parties everywhere and in every forum where the same matters are
drawn into question. It is not the particular relief which was granted
which affects the parties litigating in the court of this state; but
it is the adjudication and determination of the facts by the court,
the final decision that the judgment was procured by fraud, which
is operative here and necessarily prevents the plaintiffs from prosecuting any claim under it."
But that case also involved a conflict of laws principle and the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution was not involved.
The judgment had been granted by the Connecticut court and it is
logical to hold that it should have the right to remove it upon discovery of fraud and that such decision should be given extra-territorial efficacy." But in the present case the right of the plaintiff
did not arise under a judgment but was the creature of a Federal
statute, thus distinguishing it.
There is nothing to show in the instant case whether the injunction was or was not a final decree. If it had only been a temporary
order, it is clear that Minnesota would not be required to give it full
faith and credit because the Iowa court would still retain a measure
of control over it.
Thus in England and the majority jurisdictions of this country,
an order to pay alimony does not have the consequences of a final
judgment because of the right retained by the court making the
12 N. Y. x56 (1854).
There the plaintiff in a judgment recovered in
New York brought action in Connecticut, whereupon the defendant, in a
suit where the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, obtained an injunction against the maintaining of the action on the judgment on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. An assignee of
the judgment then brought suit in New York and it was held by the New
York court that the finding of the Connecticut court in the injunction
proceeding that the judgment was fraudulent, was conclusively upon the
New York court, a duly authenticated copy of the proceedings .and judgment in the Connecticut court having been admitted in evidence.
u The fraud in the judgment having been found as a matter of fact.
'Nouroin v. Freeman, L. 1. x5 A. C i (x8go).
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order to modify it. 13 And the same principle has been extended to
cases, similar to the instant one, where the injunction is only interlocutory. Thus, the 'Minnesota court in Dais v. Minneapolis, etc.
Ry. Co.,4 held that a citizen who had a cause of action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act and who had brought his action in
Minnesota would not be restrained from proceeding in that state be
cause of a temporary injunction granted against him by a foreign.
state.
It is difficult to see on principle the distinction between an interlocutory restraining order and a final one so. far as giving full faith
and credit to it is concerned. As has been pointed out the injunction
does not operate against the court of the foreign jurisdiction but
rather against the person residing in the jurisdiction, in which -the
injunction is granted. Therefore if the court has proper jurisdiction of the parties in a transitory action, there is no more reason
why it should be affected by a final decree in another state than it
would be in the case of a temporary order. If the decree is made by
statute to operate both in reni and in personam, a different problem
would be presented; but in the principal case the injunction was
purely against the person.
It is submitted that an equity decree is not within the contemplation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. A legislature cannot create a transitory action and by statute confine its enforcement to its own courts upon a claim that the full faith and credit
clause requires the courts of another state to decline to entertain the
action.15 And similarly the courts of one state should not be forced
to recognize such decrees of a sister state because the effect would
be to open the door to the exercise of an arbitrary control by the
lgislatures over persons subject to its jurisdiction outside the state.
Likewise it is conceivable that the courts of one state Would thus
be given considerable control over the litigation in another state,
which would result in retaliatory measures and considerable ill-feelincg.
The party of whom the court has jurisdiction is bound by the
commands of the injunction and against him the court may exercise
such coercive measures as are appropriate.
D. F.M.
Bailey v. Bailey, L. R. 1.4Q. B. D. 855 (x884); Sistare. v. Sistare,
2x8 U. S. T (19o)." See also Minor. Conflict of Laws 207. Contra: Raymond v. Blamgrass. 36 Mont. 449, 93 Pac. 648 (i9o8). See also 21 COL. L.
REv. 98. Barton Baker in 6 CoaNELL L. QUART. 324, dealing with the full
faith and credit clause in the case of judgments in actions for divorce
and separation says: "The full faith and credit cause establishes a rule of
evidence rather than of jurisdiction. The rule makes the record of a judgment conclusive evidence, in the courts of another state or of the United
States of the matter adjudged, hut does not affect the jurisdiction either
of the court in which judgment is rendered or of the court in which it is
offered in evidence:'
11134 Minn. 455, 159 N. W. o84 (1916).
"'Tennessee Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354 (1T4); Atchinson . R. Co.
v. Sawers, 213 U. S. 5 (1909).
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DUTY OF A COLLECTING BANK TO RECEIVE PAY' ENT ONLY

IN M'o EY.-It is a general rule of law that an agent who is employed

to collect a claim of his principal against a debtor may receive in
payment money, and nothing else, unless specially authorized." This
rule has been frequently applied to banks to which commercial paper
is entrusted for collection." It is the duty of such a bank to present
the check, draft or note to the drawee or maker, and to demand cash.'
Nevertheless, the commercial banks of this country do not, in practice, follow the c6urse of conduct which the law prescribes. In the
great majority of instances, the collecting bank will surrender the instrument to be collected to the drawee or maker, taking in its place
his uncertified check or draft on some other institution. 3 This practice is especially frequent in the collection of items on which the
party liable is another financial institution.
This usage of the financial world has certain distinct advantages.
It permits the settlement of accounts without the necessity of the
actual transfer of cash. How the business of large centers of commerce could be carried on in any other way is hard to conceive. If
every bank were required to settle in money with every other bank,
the difficulty of conducting business would be greatly increased. Nor
is the practice less useful in the collection of items on distant places.
The expense and risk of shipping money from point to point by express is saved. Nevertheless, the practice has never been established
in the eves of the law, and accordingly the collecting bank is frequently held liable when the substituted paper which it received
from the debtor proves to be worthless.
It has been held that a bank holding a check or draft for collection may not receive in payment depreciated currency,' or the
uncertified check of the drawee on some other institution, or even
his certified check.6 Should it do so, it renders itself liable to the
owner of the item to be collected, to whom we may refer as the depositor or the creditor; 7 and if, believing the check it has received to
be good, it pays the amount to him, it cannot recover it when it
1

Meclem, Agency

(2d ed., 1914), see. 946.
Morse on Banks and Banking (5th ed., 1917), see. 247.
*2 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (6th ed., 1913) 1831.
'Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447 (U. S. i869).

'Merchants' National Bank v. Goodman, io9 Pa. 422, 2 At. 687 (1885);
Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83 Pac. o48 (9o5)); Landa v. Traders
Bank, x18 Mo. App. 356, 94 S. XV. 770 (go6); Wingfield v. Security National Bank, 38 S. D. 491, i5z N. W. 309 (1917).

'German-American Bank v. Third National Bank, Fed. Cas. No. 5, 359
(U. S. 1878); see Daniel, op. cit., sec. 1626, 1627.
'Whitney v. Esson, 99 Mass. 3o8 (868); Bank of Indian Territory v.
First National Bank, xog Mo. App. 665. 83 S. W. 537 (i9o4); Bradley
Lumber Co. v. Bradley County Bank, 2o6 Fed. 4, 124 C. C. A. i75 (x913);
Bank of Shaw v. Ransom. 112 Miss. 440, 73 So. 280 (x916).
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8
learns that payment on the new check will be refused. Similarly,
the bank employed to collect a check is liable if, instead of receiving cash, it has the check certified, and the drawee becomes insolvent before it is paid.9
These rules apply not only to banks, but also to other agencies
10
employed to collect commercial papei, such as express companies.
of
There have been a few cases in which the validity of the custom
banks to take something other than money in payment has been recognized. One English case held that a London banker who took a
check in payment of a bill of exchange was not negligent, because
however, has been
he followed the usual custom. 1 This decision,
2 In a few American
today."
law
the
not
is
probably
criticised, and
states the custom seems to prevail,"' but in the great majority of
cases either the defendant has failed to establish it," or the court
has held it to be unreasonable and contrary to recognized rules
of law.' s
In some states the rule is laid down that,. if the collecting bank
should accept the check of the debtor instead of cash, it makes the
check its own."8 Its liability is exactly the same as though it had in
fact received cash. It is responsible for the face value of the instrument sent to it for collection.' 7
Other courts have taken the view that the owner of the check
must prove that actual loss was occasioned by the failure of the bank
to demand payment in money.' s Where a check is received, and
every effort is made to collect it at once, and the liability of all the
parties to the original instrument is preserved intact, the collecting

'Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co., 749 Ill. 343, 3 N. E. xo29 (1894);
Parodi v. State Savings Bank, 113 Miss. 364, 74 So. 28o (197).
'Essex Co. National Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193 (U. S. C.
C. 1876).
°Gowling v. American Express Co., io2 Mo. App. 366, 76 S. W,. 712
('903).
21Russel v. Hankey, 6 T. R. 12, io Eng. Reprints 409 (I794)'See Byles, Bills, (i8th ed. 1923) 24.
" Farmers' Bank and Trust Co. v. Newland, 97 Ky. 464, 31 S. V. 38
(1895); Jefferson Co. Savings Bank v. Commercial National Bank, 98
Tenn. 331, 39 S. W. 338 (i8g6): Kershaw v. Lass, 34 Ore. 375, 56 Pac. 402
(i8g); First Nat. Bank of Memphis v. First Nat. Bank of Clarendon,
134 S. W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911).
"Albert v. State Bank, 78 Misc. 56 738 N. Y. S. 237 (igIz).
" National Bank v. American Exchange Bank, 151 Mo. 320, 52 S. V.
265 (x8gg).
"Fifth National Bank v. Ashworth, 123 Pa. 212, x6 At. 596 (i888).
It Essex Co. National Bank v. Bank of Montreal, supra, note 9; National
Bank1 v. American Exchange Bank, supra, note 1s.
320 (1879).
' First National Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 77 N. Y.
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bank goes free. .Of course, if the drawer, or some iridorser is released by the act of the collecting bank in failing to protest the original item within the required time, the depositor of the check can
recover.2 0 .Frequently, also, the drawee or maker could have paid
cash if it had been demanded on presentation of the instriment, but.
has become insolvent during the time the agent bank was trying to
collect the-check taken in payment. 21 In many other instances, however, the drawee or maker was insolvent and unable to pay cash from
the very first; the collecting bank has used all possible diligence to
collect the substituted check, and, having failed, has secured possession of the old instrument, and done all that was necessary to preserve the liabilities of all parties.22 In such a case, since the owner
of the instrument has suffered no loss which he would not have incurred, had cash been demanded and the instrument protested at
once, it seems unjust to permit him to recover more than nominal
damages for his agent's fault.
The question of the effect of the taking of a check by a bank is
sometimes presented in another aspect, namely, when the debtor is
sued and pleads payment. Did the act of the collecting bank discharge the debtor, or does he still remain liable? The collecting bank,
in taking the check, acted outside of the scope of-its authority. Accordingly, where the debtor is the maker of a note, and is primarily
liable, he cannot escape. 23 The discharge, being unauthorized, does
not bind the principal. Besides, in almost all states it is the law
that a debtor's check, in the absence of a special agreement, operates only as conditional payment; 2 so that, if the maker's check is
unpaid, he is still liable on the original instrument.25 When the check
is paid, the situation is as though the collecting bank had received cash
in the beginning, and the maker is discharged.2 6
Where the depositor sues someone not primarily liable on the
original instrument, such as the drawer of a check or draft, the situation is somewhat different. Such a person is entitled to have the
instrument protested within a certain time if it is not paid, and to
receive notice of such protest. The collecting bank, by receiving

"Interstate National Bank v. Ringo, 72 Kan. 116, 83 Pac. 1i9 (1905);
Helsinger v. Trickett, 86 Ohio St. 286, 99 N. E. 305 (1912) ; Bellevue Bank
v. National Security Bank, 168 Iowa 707, iso N. W. xo76 (gix5); Central
Exchange National Bank v. First National Bank, 214 S. W. 66D (Tex. Civ.
App. 'gig).
" First National Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 89 N. Y. 412 (1892).
'Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co., supra, note &
' Cases cited in note 1g, supra.
"Mechem, Agency, (2nd ed. 1914), sec. 946.

'Dille v. White, 132 Iowa 327, x0 N. V. gog (r9o6). In Mass., Me.,
Vt. and Ind., the taking of the debtor's check creates a presumption that the
debt has been paid. 3o Cyc. ri98.
'Bellevue Bank v. National Security Bank, supra, note g.
"Griffin v. Ersklne, 131 Iowa 444, log N. W. ta (zgo6).
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the check of the drawee even as conditional payment, may make it
impossible for itself to comply with these requirements. In this case
the drawer is released, and his creditor no longer has any action
against him on the debt which the check or draft was intended to pay.
The creditor is precluded27from recovery by the negligence of his
agent, the collecting bank.
It seems well established, however, that the collecting bank, if
it is solvent, may receive a check upon itself in payment, and that
by doing so it releases the debtor, if he actually had sufficient funds
on deposit."-" It would be a useless proceeding for the person liable
on the instrument to go to one part of the bank, draw out the necessary amount of cash, take it to another part, and pay his obligation.
The same reasoning would sustain the decision that a certificate of
deposit on the collecting bank operates as payment.29 The fact that
the bank fails to account to the party from whom it received the instrument to be collected should make no more difference in this situation than where it has received actual cash. If the debtor should
have no funds on deposit with the collecting bank, his worthless
check will not operate as payment.30 Where the bank, unknown to
its officers or to the debtor, is insolvent, there are cases which hold
that the latter is not discharged.3 1 Where a note is payable at a
particular bank to which it is sent for collection, and the maker directs the bank to pay it out of funds deposited to his credit, the acts
of the bank in debiting his account, marking the note "Paid," etc.,
will constitute payment.3 2 This is also true where a check is sent to
the drawee bank. is marked "Paid," and the depositor is charged
with its amount.3
'Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md. 312,

29

At. 527 (894); Noble v. Doughton,

jupra, note 5.
"Pollak Bros. v. Neill-Herrin Co., 137 Ga. 23, 72 S. B. 415 (19 1);
Bierce v. State National Bank, 33 Okla. 776, 127 Pac. 856 (i912); Shafer v.
Olsen, 24 N. D. 542, 139 N. W. 983 ('913); State National Bank v. First
See also Baldwins
National Bank, 124 Ark. 53T, 187 S. W. 673 (i976).
Bank v. Smith, 2S N. Y. 76, 7o9 N. E. 738 (1975), where the maker of a
note orally directed the bank to pay it out of his deposit account; and Beck
v. Capital Fire Insurance Co., zoo Neb. 26o, i59 N. W. 405 (i976), affirtmied
on rehearsing i2 Neb. 702, 769 N. NV. 262 (1916).
"British & American Mortgage Co. v. Tabbals, 63 Iowa 468, ig N. W.
319 (1894). But a note of the debtor given to the collecting bank would
not discharge the debt. Scott v. Gilkey, 153 Ill. 168, 39 N. E. 265 (1894).
":Western Brass Mfg. Co. v. Maverick, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 535, 23 S. W.
728 (1893).
1U. S. National Bank v. Shupack, 54 Mont 542, 172 Pac. 324 (1918);
Sanitary Can Co. v. National Pickle Co., 191 Iowa 7259, 184 N. W. 354
(9g2).
See also Donough v. Gillespie, 27 Ont. App. z)2 (1894).
'Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N. E.
670 (1903).
' O'Leary Bros. v. Abeles, 68 Ark. 259, 57 S. W. f97 (igoo); Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 72o Tenn. 225, ii S. W. 248
(11907).

NOTES

In the recent case of Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v.
4 the Supreme Court of the United States has re;
Malloy Brothers,"
affirmed the rule that a collecting bank which fails to demand money
in payment is liable to the owner of the check for any injury he may
suffer. The plaintiffs had deposited in their own bank a check of
their debtor on the Bank of Lumber Bridge, North Carolina. This
check was sent to the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the defendant, for collection, and was by it forwarded directly to the
drawee bank. The latter charged the account of the drawer, stamped
the check "Paid," and remitted to the defendant its draft on 'athird
institution, which the defendant accepted and tried to collect. It was
dishonored because the Bank of Lumber Bridge had not sufficient
funds. After some delay, during which the defendant was trying
to force the Bank of Lumber Bridge to make good the draft, the
check was charged back to the bank from which it had been received, and which, in turn, charged it back to the plaintiffs. The latter brought suit, alleging that the Federal Reserve Bank had been
negligent. The Supreme Court assumed, for the purposes of the
case, that it was not negligent in sending the check directly to the
bank on which it was drawn, because of the regulation of the Federal
Reserve Board authorizing it to do so. 5 They held, however, that a
collecting bank is without authority to accept, in payment of commiercial paper, anything other than money; that it was not so authorized by the regulation of the Board that it might send checks directly
to the drawee; that the plaintiffs, having no knowledge of the practice of the defendant bank, were not bound by its alleged custom
to receive exchange in payment of collections; and that no custom of
banks, sufficiently definite and well established to be binding on them
without their knowledge, was proved. The plaintiff was permitted
to recover the full amount of the check, since the action of the defendant had caused him to lose his right of action against the drawer.
It is submitted that the decision of the court is entirely sound.
The collecting bank should be held to a strict accountability for its
actions when it goes beyond the limits of its authority. That in collecting a negotiable instrument it must receive only money in payment is a settled rule of law, which even an almost universal practice
of banks should not overthrow. If it is thought desirable to alter
this rule, it should be done by statutory enactment.

C.W.F.

"44 Sup. Ct. 296.

The decisions of the courts below are. found in 281

Fed. 997, and 29t Fed. -63.

'Regulation J (8): "In handling items for member and non-member
clearing banks, a Federal Reserve Bank will act as agent only. The board
will require that each member and non-member clearing bank authorize its
Federal Reserve Bank to send checks for collection to banks on which the
checks are drawn, and, except for negligence, Fuch Federal Reserve Bank
will assume no liability."
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES AFFECTING MAT-

TERS OF ADMIRALTY COGNIZANCE.-By article II, section 2, of the

Constitution, the judicial power of.the United States is extended to

all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. And by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Federal Judicial Code, the Federal district courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases
the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." - This saving clause has always been regarded as3
having been inserted in the act to express the constitutional meaning,
since the concurrent jurisdiction of admiralty and common law
courts in many cases was so well recognized when the Constitution
was adopted that such cases could "no more be deemed cases of admiralty jurisdiction than cases of common law jurisdiction." I
For many years admiralty and state courts, under these provisions, exercised c6ncurrent jurisdiction over maritime contracts and
torts,5 each applying its own principles to the cases before it. Proceedings in rem by libel were recognized to be peculiar to admiralty
law, and consequently within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty
courts.6 But as to practically every action in personam there was a
right to proceed in either court.? And although attempts were made
to prevent the application of any new state statutory remedies to
maritime cases, they were not successful, and new remedies or special
provisions were applied in admiralty 8 as well as state 9 courts.
The growth of workmen's compensation acts in many states
during recent years gave rise to a contest between admiralty and state
jurisdiction. After a number of states had sustained the application
of these acts to maritime injuries, the question finally reached the
United States Supreme Court. In the case of Southwrn Pacific Co.
v. Jenscn,0 a stevedore had been killed in an accident on board-a ship
lying at its pier in New York harbor. The New York courts awarded

his widow compensation under the compensation act of that state."

'Act of 1911, 36 Stat. L 1o87. c. 231.
*Sect. 24, clause 3; sec. 256, clause 3.
"The New Supremacy of Admiralty, E. M. Dodd, Jr., zt COLA. L. REV.
647; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583 (U. S. 185% ; N. J. Navigatiora Co. v.
Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344 (U. S. 1848).
"Story, The Law of the Constitution, see. 1&2, note 2.
'IL e.-Contracts involving maritime subject matter; torts committed on
navigable waters.
"The Rob't .%V. Parsons, i9r U. S. iY (19o3); The Glide, 167 U. S.
6o6 (180).
' Ransberry v. North Am. Transp. Co., 22 Wash. 476 (t9o5); affirmed,
203 U. S. 579 (i9o6).

I The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (1907).
'Am. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, ir5 Wall. S= (U. S. 1872).
" 244 U.

S. 205 (1917).

S215 N. Y. 514 (1915).
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But on appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the New
York award and declared, in a five-to-four decision, that state compensation could not be applied to any maritime accident. The majority opinion declared that admiralty jurisdiction was given to Federal courts by the Constitution in order to secure uniformity of law
throughout the country on the subject; and that to allow any state
statute providing new rights to be applied to maritime matters would
be causing a substantial change in maritime law, a thing which lay
only within the power of Congress.
This decision aroused widespread comment and criticism. Jusand
tice Holmes and justice Pitney wrote strong dissenting opinions,
legal journals throughout the country discussed the case. 2 Consequently it is unnecessary to discuss its merits here.
As a result of the Jenscn case,"3 Congress, in 1917, amended the
saving clause of the judiciary Code so as to save from the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal courts "to claimants the rights hInd remedies under the Workmen's Compensation laws of any state." 1" But
this was of no avail. The Supreme Court, divided five to four, in
the case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Ste-wart, 1 declared the amendment unconstitutional on the ground that delegation of authority to
the states to enact laws to affect maritime accidents violates the requirement of uniformity; and that any change in admiralty law must
be made by Congress directly and as a result of its own deliberations.
Thus was taken a second stride toward the establishment of admiralty law as a code apart from other law, and controlling exclusively all matters of possible admiralty cognizance, irrespectfve of
also received
the tribunal before which they may be.' 6 This case
wide discussion in legal periodicals of the country 17
In an effort to meet the objections of the Court, as expressed in
the Knickcrbocker Ice Co. case," to the effect that the amended.saving clause would permit substantial changes in admiralty law by the
states, the clause was again amended. By the amendment of 1922 29
masters of vessels and members of crews were excluded from those
who might claim under state compensation acts for maritime in2 See notes in 27 YALE L. JoruR. 255, 294; 6 CALIF. L. Rav. 72; 17 COL.
L REV. 703; 15 Mici. L. Rv. 657; also, citations in notes 16 and 17, infra.
"Supra, note 1o.
"40 Stat. L 395, c. 97.
"253 U. S. 149 (1920).
"See articles by J. G. Palfrey, 36 HAR. L REv. 777; and Frederic
Cunningham, 53 A-t. L. REv. 749, reprinted in 5 Mass. L. Quarterly 74.
"170 U. oF PA.. I 1,.42; 54 Am. L. REv. 908; 20 COLA. L Rrv. 685;
Y8 MIcH. L Ray. 793.
" Supra, note 14.
"842 Stat. L 634, C. 216.
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juries2 0 Thus it was hoped that the acts could be made effective
at least as to stevedores, repairmen employed by independent contractors and others working on a ship but not engaged in its operation. But the new amendment has now met the fate of its predecessor. In the cases of State of Washington v.Dawson and Industrial Accident Commission of California v. Rolph,2' heard and de22
cided together, the Supreme Court,. on the principles- of the Jensen
23
and the Knickerbocker Ice Co. cases held the new amendment unconstitutional as violating the requirement of uniformity, declaring
that mere exclusion of masters and crews did not overcome any of
the invalid features of the clause in its prior form. Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes dissented.
It is a well-established principle that the test whether a tort is a
maritime tort or not is solely one of locality; 24 neither the nature of
the act nor of the actor can affect the status. If the injury occurs
at sea or on navigable inland waters, if on a ship in mid-ocean or
one tied to a pier in navigable waters, it is a maritime tort. Consequently it would seem that the Court was entirely logical in the
present cases when it held that exclusion of certain classes of persons could not modify the effect of the saving clause upon admi-dty
law.
One of the arguments which Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting
opinion, urges against the majority view is that the saving clause as
last amended would prevent interference with the uniformity that,
according to the recent decisions, is required by the Constitution. He
says:
"How can the law of New York, making a New York employer
liable, . . . mar the proper harmony and uniformity of the assumed general maritime law in its interstate and international relations, when neither a ship, nor a ship owner, is the employer affected,
even though the accident occurs on board a vessel on navigable waters? The relation of the independent contractor to his employee is
a matter wholly of state concern. The employer's obligation to pay,
and the employee's right to receive compensation, are not dependent
.
Nor
upon any act or omission of the ship or of its owners. .
can it affect the ship owners in any respect, except as any other
tax, direct or indirect, . . . may affect, by increasing the cost
. . . saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants for
compensation for injuries to or death of persons other than the master or
members of the crew of a vessel their rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any -state . .
44 Sup. Ct. 30,

1923-1924 Adv. Ops. 339. Decided Feb. 25, I924.

"Supra, note 9.
"Supra, note 14.
"Industrial Comm. v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263 (1922) ; The Plymouth,
3 Wall. 2o (U.S. 1865).

NOTES
of living and of doing business, every one who has occasion to enter
it and many who have not.'"
This argument, however, in so far as it contends that no liability
would be imposed on ship owners, is not sound in its general application. Although correct as to the Compensation Act of New York,
which Justice Brandeis chooses as his example, it would not be so
under the acts of many other staes, in which the owner of premises may become liable for injuries sustained by workmen on his
premises,
whether he is the immediate employer of such workman
25
or not.

As was previously said, the merits of the Jensen and the
Knickerbockcr Ice Co. cases, and the requirement of uniformity
therein set up, are not considered here. But, accepting them as law,
as must be done, it would seem that the present cases are entirely
consistent with them, since the amendment of 192221 did not eliminate the features which made for lack of uniformity.
One week before the decision in Washington v. Dawson 21 was
handed down, the Supreme Court rendered a decision which does
not seem to be very closely in harmony with the line of cases just
considered. A statute of New Yorks28 gave to courts of that state
power to decree specific performance of executory contracts to arbitrate, a decree which equity and admiralty alike have hitherto refused
to make." A charter party, admittedly a maritime contract, contained an agreement to arbitrate any dispute that might. arise thereunder. A dispute arose,-the defendant refused to arbitrate, and the
plaintiff, proceeding under the statute, obtained a decree of specific
performance. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decree 3'
on the authority of Southern Pacific Co. v: Jensen and Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, saying that "to sustain the arbitration clause and
enforce it in the state courts would be to deny the Federal court the
exclusive jurisdiction with which Congress has clothed it, and likewise destroy a rule of uniformity." But, on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the
statute held to be constitutional, in the case of Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co 1
Thus, a statute which provides a new remedy is allowed to govern a maritime contract, although workmen's compensation acts,
which provide new remedies for injuries, cannot be applied to mariE. g., Pa. Act of 19i5,. P. L. 736, sec. 203; Calif. Workmen's Compensation Act 1917, sec. 25.
Supra, notes i8 and ig.
Supra, note

20.

1920, C. 275, Consol. Laws, c. 72.
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo (U. S. C. C. 1845).

N. Y. Laws of

Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 233 N. Y. 373, 135 N. E. 82zi
(1922).
344 Sup.

Ct.

274, t923-i924

Adv. Ops. 293. Decided Feb. 18, tz4.

-
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time injuries. The opinion of the Court dwells largely on the fact
that arbitration agreements have long been recognized by admiralty
and common law courts, and damages were recoverable for the
breach of such agreements.3 2 Consequently it is declared that this
is not creating a new substantive right, but merely a new remedy for
enforcing an old right, and so is not a substantial interference with
any established admiralty law, and is entirely valid. But admiralty
has also always recognized rights of recovery for injuries and deaths
arising from numerous causes.3 3 Is a new remedy of specific performance then any less a change of law than workmen's compensation? And since both are equally strange to the procedure of admiralty courts, 3 4 how does one less than the other, invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts?
It would appear that the situations are not distinguishable, and
Justice .McReynolds, in a dissenting opinion in Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co.,3' so argues. Apparently the division between
what causes a substantial change in admiralty law and violates the
Court's rule of uniformity, and what does no, is a very shadowy line.
H.C.A.
"Citing Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U. S. 370 (i89o) and Hecker
v. Fowler, 2 Wal. 123 (U. S. 1864).
*See dissenting opinion in Washington v. Dawson, supra, note 14.
"See cases cited in note 28, supra.

I Supra, note

3o.

